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This chapter discusses adjudication, expertise, and cultural difference as it 
appears in criminal court cases concerning female genital cutting (FGM) in the 
EU, as reported in a 2015 comparative overview. It begins with the distinction 
between typical and atypical FGM cases; a distinction that connects court cases 
to the cultural realities of the practicing communities, suggesting that the lack of 
cultural knowledge can cause unnecessary suffering to families and/or individuals 
who wrongly undergo prosecution in alleged FGM cases. A contrario, the 
intervention of experts in FGM court cases could be a positive approach to 
assessing the legitimacy of public intervention in certain cases. 
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Practices of female circumcision, also referred to as “female genital cutting” 
(FGC) or “female genital mutilation” (FGM),2 are prevalent primarily in some 
30 African countries. With migration, the issue is increasingly relevant also 
for European societies (Johnsdotter & Essén, 2016; Johnsdotter & Mestre i 
Mestre, 2017). The European Commission estimates that at least 500,000 
women and girls in Europe have undergone some kind of FGM and according 
to the WHO 180,000 girls are at risk. The number of reports, research studies, 
and parliamentary actions in Europe are significant, and a 2015 comparative 
overview of FGM criminal court cases within the EU, based on data collected 
by country experts in 11 European countries, shows little occurrence of the 
practice in criminal courts.3 FGM is prosecutable in all countries in Europe, 
either through specific criminal law provisions or through general criminal 
legislation, but fewer than 50 FGM criminal court cases exist in Europe, and 
a majority of them took place in France in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Mestre i Mestre RM & Johnsdotter S (2019).  
”Court cases, cultural expertise, and ‘female genital mutilation’ in Europe.”  




Exploring the reasons for such disparities between estimates of affected 
girls and women, however, and court cases on the other is way beyond the 
scope of this chapter. It could be argued that, as any form of violence against 
women (VAW), FGM is particularly difficult to prevent, detect, prosecute, 
and punish efficiently. It is, however, unreasonable to believe that all 
European states fail in protecting girls at that scale. An alternative explanation 
would be that the number of unrecorded cases is much lower than what official 
conjectures suggest, making post-colonial feminist arguments more 
convincing. It has been argued (Peroni, 2016) that Western European states 
and institutions have targeted VAW of migrant background in ways that are 
stigmatizing by (1) putting disproportionate attention on and framing 
specifically certain forms of violence, (2) defining as cultural certain forms of 
VAW in ways that are stigmatizing toward minorities (as if the majority’s 
forms of violence were not cultural), and (3) creating gendered racialized 
categories to describe non-Western women affected by violence (vulnerable 
women or girls at risk). What is usually called “FGM” is one of such forms of 
violence that receive disproportionate attention. By identifying FGM as a 
cultural form of VAW, we disregard the ways in which culture shapes the 
subordination of women in Europe and the cultural forms of violence 
embedded in, for instance, the ideology of romantic love.4 Montoya and 
Rolandsen Agustín (2013) argue that the European institutional discourse 
recognizing different forms of VAW has tended toward its culturalization, 
focusing much on diagnosis but failing to address solutions. In the same vein, 
the abovementioned 2015 report on FGM criminal court cases suggests that 
reiterated law enforcement concerns are not coupled with training and 
prevention that are needed in the case of FGM in Europe.  
Keeping these difficult questions as a backdrop, this chapter will 
discuss adjudication, expertise, and cultural difference as they appear in 
criminal court cases concerning FGM in the EU. The discussion is organized 
in four parts. First, a brief contextualization of the practice in Europe will help 
understanding of the distinction between typical and atypical FGM cases that 
we suggest adopting. Typical cases are those where some type of FGM has 
been performed, either on European soil or abroad; atypical cases are cases 
without solid ground or evidence in a court of law. This distinction is not 
common in public discourse on FGM,5 but needs to be made from a position 
that builds on deeper insights into the actual FGM criminal court cases. It 
connects court cases to the cultural realities of the practicing communities, 
and requires previous knowledge about the different practices and 
communities, their migratory history, and the status in Europe of those 
involved. Both typical and atypical cases can originate on European soil or 
abroad, which makes their analysis more complex, as we will try to show. 
The second part of this chapter will analyze some atypical cases that 
have reached the courts, raising issues of whether the intervention of experts 
is needed, and if so, of what type (anthropological, medical, both?), when (in 
what procedural moment) and for what purpose. The intervention of experts 
here seems to be more an evidential-building step than an evaluative one. By 
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calling “atypical” the cases that should not have reached court, we argue that 
the lack of cultural knowledge or expertise can cause unnecessary suffering to 
families and individuals who wrongly undergo prosecution on an alleged 
FGM case. A contrario, the intervention of experts could be a positive 
approach to assessing the legitimacy of public intervention in certain FGM 
court cases. 
The analysis of typical cases, cases in which FGM has been performed, 
and their complexities will lead us to the fact that, in some of them, the defense 
has tried for the acquittal of parents by claiming “error in prohibition.” This 
chapter argues that the ways in which error of prohibition relate to cultural 
difference need to be further explored. The chapter will conclude on the 
relationship between error iuris and cultural difference, where the purpose of 
the intervention of a “cultural expert” appears to be related to the task of 
evaluating the action under judgment, and when that action implies some form 
of VAW. 
 
FGM IN EUROPE 
The recognition of VAW as a human rights violation in the international 
agenda has been a matter of struggle, celebration, and concern among 
feminists: struggle, for it was not until the 1990s that VAW entered 
international human rights law; celebration because it was done by connecting 
violence to inequality and subordination; and concern for, as Peroni (2016) 
puts it, the overemphasis on female victimhood may perpetuate stereotypes of 
women in need of protection. This is particularly true for non-western women. 
The international fight against FGM has followed the same familiar pattern of 
struggle, celebration, and concern. The Beijing Platform for Action of the IV 
World Conference on Women of the United Nations declared in 1995 that 
FGM is a form of VAW. The international consensus reached in 2008 as to 
the definition of FGM is expressed in the Interagency Statement,6 according 
to which FGM comprises all procedures involving the partial or total removal 
of the external female genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for 
non-medical reasons. It acknowledges four types of procedures: 
clitoridectomy, excision, infibulation, and unclassified.7 The type of cutting 
and procedure varies from one country to the next and also varies among 
ethnic groups.8 
FGM is prohibited in all European countries,9 either through specific 
criminal provisions (as in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK) or through general provisions in the Penal Code that 
penalize bodily injury and mutilation (e.g., Finland, France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands). The Council of Europe Convention on preventing and 
combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul 
Convention) entered into force in 2014, and although it is not the first action 
undertaken by the Council of Europe regarding gender-based violence,10 it is 
the first legally binding document. Almost all member states of the Council of 
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Europe have signed it11 and it can be considered the common understanding 
and standard to combat VAW.12 It introduces some interesting features into 
European domestic legal systems as regards FGM, such as the “due diligence” 
standard regarding state responsibility for non-state acts of violence.13 The 
standard, as declared by DEVAW (1994),14 refers to the obligation of states 
to “pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
violence against women,” including “due diligence to prevent, investigate and, 
in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against 
women, whether those acts are perpetuated by the state or by private 
persons.”15 Thus, the Istanbul Convention provides the general obligations of 
the duty to prevent, protect and support; investigate, prosecute and judicially 
protect, as well as provide effective access to justice for victims of VAW.16 
It specifically addresses FGM in Art. 38: 
 
Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that 
the following intentional conducts are criminalized: 
(a) excising, infibulating, or performing any other mutilation on the whole 
or any part of a woman’s labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris; 
(b) coercing or procuring a woman to undergo any of the acts listed in point 
a; 
(c) inciting, coercing or procuring a girl to undergo any of the acts listed in 
point (a)17 
 
Aiding or abetting and attempting the commission of the offense in 38.a 
must also be considered an offense and these acts cannot be justified as 
cultural, religious, customary, or other (Art. 42). Regarding state jurisdiction, 
the Istanbul Convention establishes the obligation for states to ensure that its 
jurisdiction covers all the offenses committed within the territory of the state, 
to or by one of her nationals, or a person that has his or her habitual residence 
in the territory. It demands as well that the state ensures jurisdiction beyond 
its territory, when the offense is committed to or by one of their nationals or a 
person who has his or her habitual residence on their territory, and whether 
the act is criminalized in the territory where they were committed or not (Art. 
4418). This means that the principle of extraterritoriality of all the states 
analyzed in the 2015 report covered acts committed abroad by a national or 
resident, or to a national or resident, either in Europe or in the country of 
origin. This is puzzling for jurists, as extraterritoriality is a principle seldom 
used, and one requiring double incrimination. It is also puzzling that European 
states are virtually competent to persecute any act of FGM performed by a 
resident, regardless of the place of commission and the victim of such a crime. 
The reason for this emphasis in extraterritoriality and in non-requiring double-
incrimination lies in the fact that some girls of European background have 
undergone FGM while visiting family in the countries of origin of their 
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parents. There is also a fear that, knowing FGM is prohibited in Europe, 
families will submit the girls to the practice before migrating to Europe. 
This complexity makes the classification and analysis of court cases 
very difficult: typical cases would be cases in which an act of FGM 
(Interagency statement Types I, II, and III, according to the Istanbul 
Convention) has been performed by or to a European national or resident, 
either on European soil or abroad. The kind of evidence needed and 
justification of the judge’s decision are arguably different in both cases, as is 
the need or justification for asking for cultural advice at some point. Atypical 
cases are cases in which prosecution happens on an unlikely FGM act, either 
because the alleged author or victim does not belong to a practicing 
community; because the act cannot qualify as FGM; or because, taking into 
consideration the practicing community the victim belongs to, it is incorrect 
to point to the alleged actor as responsible for the narrative “to make sense.”  
The last factor to consider regarding prosecution of FGM in Europe is 
the different models of Public Prosecution of European states, along the 
common law/continental law divide and within the continental system itself 
(Martín Pastor, García Marqués, & Eloy Azevedo, 2014).19 The public 
authority given the power to investigate, the extent and principles guiding such 
power, its limits and how it relates to the victim’s actions, vary from country 
to country, making the comparison of FGM prosecution across Europe an 
extremely difficult task. Our proposal is to call typical cases those where some 
type of FGM as prohibited by the Istanbul Convention has been performed, 
either on European soil or abroad. Atypical cases are cases that should not 
have initiated legal procedures. This distinction, which connects court cases 
to the cultural realities of the practicing communities, requires previous 
knowledge about the different practices and works well regardless of the 
public prosecuting system of any given state. Information about the public 
prosecuting system could, however, be of interest when discussing at what 
procedural moment and initiated by whom cultural expertise could be of help 
in detecting and avoiding atypical cases. 
 
ATYPICAL FGM CASES MAKE UNFAIR COURT CASES 
On Thursday June 26, 2015, The Telegraph reported: 
“Disgusting” FGM campaign wins prestigious advertising awards at Cannes. 
A heavily criticised campaign raising awareness about FGM has won Cannes 
Lion industry awards. […] The adverts depict flags of Western countries – 
such as the Union Jack – splattered with blood stains and with thick thread 
“sewing” them back together. A message printed on the flag reads: “Female 
genital mutilation doesn’t only happen in faraway places. Over 50,000 girls 
in the UK are at risk.”20 
The “it happens here” campaign was designed to raise awareness about the 
fact that FGM is still carried out in countries such as the UK, even though it 
is illegal. The campaign is very powerful and moving but misrepresents reality 
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by suggesting that the worst form of FGM (Type III) often happens and goes 
unnoticed across Europe. Raising awareness in such a strong way, the 
campaign calls for an urgent intervention from the state, investigating rumors 
and cases, and effectively prosecuting. This is particularly true in the UK 
where the case presented as the first criminal case regarding FGM in 2015 
seemed in accordance with this pressing social need to tackle FGM. In our 
opinion, however, it is the most atypical criminal court case reported: An 
obstetrician was taken to court for how he had sutured an already circumcised 
woman during delivery in November 2012. He had used a stitch to stem blood, 
and this stitch, the Prosecutor argued, could be classified as criminal according 
to the UK ban on FGM. During the trial process, the judge rejected two 
attempts by the defense to dismiss the prosecution on the grounds that, under 
the FGM Act 2003, a doctor is exempt from prosecution if a surgical 
procedure is carried out on a woman in labor or after childbirth and was 
medically necessary. The man was acquitted of the charges in February 2015. 
It is atypical in that the act hardly qualifies as FGM, the doctor definitely did 
not belong to a practicing community nor did he do it for cultural reasons: the 
prosecutor simply did not acknowledge the difference between FGM/re-
infibulation and medically indicated surgical procedures to correct trauma 
following labor.21 
Another atypical case concerns the Netherlands, where a Moroccan 
man was taken to court in 2008 for suspected FGM. Morocco is a non-
practicing country when it comes to circumcision of girls. The man’s daughter 
claimed that he had cut her genitalia with a pair of scissors. He was eventually 
sentenced for child abuse but acquitted for FGM. Other examples splash the 
press here and there. In January 2017, the Spanish press reported that the 
Catalan government would have to pay a married couple of Gambian origin 
for moral and psychological damages for events that occurred in 2012. They 
were detained for two days and their two daughters put in a children’s facility 
for nine days, because their pediatrician claimed that the girls’ genitalia had 
been altered. She later admitted that she had no expertise in the matter.22 In a 
Swedish case, parents of Gambian origin were detained for several weeks in 
2012 after a pediatrician had asserted that two girls, aged one and three, had 
been circumcised. Later a group involving a gynecologist, a urologist, and a 
forensic expert concluded that the girls’ genitalia were normal, and the parents 
were released.23 
All these cases reflect the willingness to open investigations and legal 
proceedings regarding FGM in different European countries. In fact, it was 
reported in The Guardian (February 4, 2015) that “[a]ccusation against Dr D. 
Dharmasena came at time of growing pressure over failure to bring FGM 
prosecution in UK.” Many have criticized the decision of the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) to bring “the apparently doomed prosecution,” 
challenging that it met the evidential test or the public interest test the CPS 
ought to apply when undertaking prosecution (Rogers, 2015).24 The 
willingness to bring criminal cases to court, demonstrated by such “atypical” 
examples, contrasts to common assumptions that the scarcity of cases in 
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Europe is due to reluctance among authorities to deal with cases of FGM. 
Indeed, one explicit policy goal at the European level is to support EU member 
states in prosecuting FGM more effectively (European Commission, 2013). 
All in all, these cases ended rather well, as prosecution stopped at an 
early stage or resulted in acquittal. The question remains, however, whether 
that suffering was necessary or if it could have been avoided with the help of 
experts, be they doctors or pediatricians with cultural expertise on the different 
practices and practicing communities, or on cultural experts who know, for 
example, that Morocco is a non-practicing country. 
The cases mentioned show that it is often difficult to decide whether 
modification of the genitalia has occurred or not. In Sweden, several criminal 
investigations demonstrate that professionals assessing small girls’ genitalia, 
when there are suspicions about circumcision, reach divergent conclusions. 
Where some physicians see clear signs of cutting, others say that the 
appearance of the (same) genitalia are normal and they thus see no signs of 
circumcision. Obviously, not all criminal court cases end in convictions, so 
the point is not that these cases resulted in acquittals, but rather that they 
should not have been taken to court at all. 
A more disturbing case occurred in Sweden in 2006 when a Somali 
father was sentenced to two years in prison for allegedly performing FGM on 
his daughter. He was convicted regardless of the fact that there was no 
evidence, neither direct nor circumstantial, and he was not likely to be the 
perpetrator (Johnsdotter, 2008a, 2008b25). The only evidence presented in 
court was his daughter’s statement during police interrogations that he had 
been in the room when she was circumcised, holding her down. Although the 
treatment evidence receives in different jurisdictions may differ, it is a 
common standard that when someone’s statement is the only evidence in court 
and there is no other valid circumstantial evidence, the statement should be 
convincing, without major contradictions,26 and the person that gives it must 
be a reliable person. In this case, during the months of repeated police 
interrogations and court proceedings, the 16-year-old girl changed her 
statements about when the circumcision took place (January 2005, or possibly 
autumn 2004; “no idea at all,” or possibly in August 2005); who was present 
in the room (the circumciser, the father, and the father’s sister; or the 
circumciser, the father, and the father’s new wife);27 how her father held her; 
who else was circumcised with her and other details. Her contradictory 
statements were offered during a time of conflict between her parents over 
custody and child benefits that was the tipping top of a conflict between two 
clans with firm loyalties to their own kin. With such a weak evidential basis, 
other forces must have been at play for the court to assess the father’s guilt – 
arguably, stereotypes about Somali men and women, and the power dynamics 
within the couple in a Muslim marriage, what happens at circumcisions in 
Somalia, the role men as fathers play in decision-making regarding 
circumcision of their daughters, and a multitude of other aspects about which 
the court had little real knowledge. For instance, had they known that among 
Somalis, it is inconceivable that a Somali man would have anything to do with 
Mestre i Mestre RM & Johnsdotter S (2019).  
”Court cases, cultural expertise, and ‘female genital mutilation’ in Europe.”  




his daughters’ genitalia and that if a man would insist on being present at a 
circumcision of a girl, the present women organizing the event would force 
him to leave, the court might have assessed the likelihood of the described 
situation differently. This case is different from the others in that an act of 
FGM had actually occurred, but evidence was far from convincing in what 
regards the responsibility of the father of the girl. It is arguable, then, that in 
the void of knowledge about the culture-specific context, typifications and 
stereotyping may guide the interpretations of testimonies, producing unfair 
results.28 
We have offered examples of two sorts of atypical cases: those in which 
no FGM was performed at all and cases where the inculpating evidence was 
not consistent with a sound cultural narrative. In the first set of cases, cultural 
expertise would be of use in informing a wide range of professionals, 
procedures, and decisions: from FGM protocols to the medical profession, or 
the public prosecuting authority. The second set of cases, in which FGM did 
happen, demonstrates that it is important that courts in Europe have access to 
knowledge about culture-specific contexts when they handle suspected cases 
of FGM in criminal courts, whether they are supposed to have happened in 
Europe or abroad. 
However, for acts performed abroad that fall within the jurisdiction of 
a European state, this need for knowledge is more evident: Courts are 
assessing crime scenes that are located faraway from Europe, and events 
described in the European courts may follow a cultural logic that is unfamiliar 
to the Western court actors. Assistance in the form of knowledgeable expertise 
is crucial for the courts to be able to establish what “probably” or “likely” 
might have happened in these culturally unfamiliar contexts. Although the 
intervention of experts here seems to be more of an evidential-building step 
than an evaluative one, it is nevertheless fundamental to guaranteeing fairness. 
By calling “atypical” the cases that should not have reached the court, our 
distinction upholds the idea that the lack of cultural knowledge or expertise 
can cause unnecessary suffering to families and or individuals that wrongly 
undergo prosecution on an alleged FGM case. 
 
TYPICAL FGM CASES 
Typical cases are cases where an FGM act was performed, either to or by a 
European national or resident, either on European soil or abroad. Several 
reported criminal court cases would match this idea of the “typical” case on 
European soil.29 In Switzerland, in 2008, two Somali parents were sentenced 
for an act committed in 1996, after they had arrived as refugees a couple of 
years earlier. They had their two-year-old daughter circumcised by a Somali 
physician who was temporarily in Switzerland and who performed 
circumcision under local anesthesia on the kitchen table. Twelve years later, 
the parents received a two-year suspended prison sentence for having 
encouraged FGM. 
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In Italy, in 2006, a woman of Nigerian origin had been under 
surveillance for some time when the police tapped a call with a two-week-old 
girl’s father concerning the operation. The woman was caught red-handed 
when she was just about to perform the act, surrounded by scissors, gauze, 
surgical spirit, Lycodine, and syringes. Other cases hit the press reporting 
similar stories in France: In 2012, there was a court case regarding incidents 
that allegedly had taken place some years earlier. A circumciser performed an 
operation on girls whose parents originated from Guinea, and the Minors 
Protection Squad is said to have found material evidence in the form of “a 
bloody kitchen roll holding pieces of genital flesh” (France country report, 
cited in Johnsdotter & Mestre i Mestre, 2015, p. 18). These cases do not seem 
to have posed serious problems from a criminal law perspective in building 
enough evidence to convict the parties. A more problematic case occurred in 
2013 when a Spanish court reached the conclusion that an illegal circumcision 
at some point had taken place in Spain although the place, date, or responsible 
actor could not be established as a matter of proven fact. The genitalia of a 
girl, whose parents originated from The Gambia, seemed intact in a first 
genital checkup, and in the next examination, they were detected as modified. 
It was assumed that something had happened on Spanish soil, since the family 
had not traveled during the period between the checks. 
The bulk of the recent criminal court cases in Europe concerns acts of 
circumcision performed in African countries, which seem far more difficult to 
assess and judge. The first Danish court case took place in 2008 and dealt with 
parents born in Eritrea who had arranged for circumcision of their daughters, 
aged four and six, in Sudan in 2003. In a recent district court case in Denmark 
(April, 2017), two Somali parents were sentenced to prison for alleged FGM 
of two girls, aged 8 and 15 years, on a trip to Kenya in the summer of 2016. 
Italy has had two cases in which circumcision was committed abroad: one 
court case in 1999 regarding circumcision of a young girl (whose mother was 
Italian) in Egypt and one pending regarding a circumcision performed in 
Nigeria. The two criminal court cases in Sweden, both in 2006, involved 
parents from Somalia, and the acts are said to have been performed in Somalia. 
One of the criminal court cases in Switzerland in 2012 built on a case where 
the girl had been circumcised in Somalia 11 years earlier. Two court cases on 
FGM reported from Spain, in 2013 and 2104, were about circumcisions 
performed in Africa, in Senegal and The Gambia. Hence, it is reasonable to 
say that the “typical” FGM case is one in which a girl with background in a 
European country is circumcised in an African country. 
In one of the Swiss cases, a woman of Somali origin had custody of a 
younger relative. She took the girl back to Somalia for a longer stay in 2001, 
where she let the girl be reunited with her biological mother, who decided to 
have the girl circumcised. What the Swiss court had to decide was whether the 
Swiss-Somali woman should have foreseen the risk of circumcision and thus 
had a duty to protect the girl against it. The court decided in 2008 that she had 
had such a duty and that she had failed it. In a Spanish case, a woman born in 
The Gambia took her two daughters back for a two-month stay during the 
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summer of 2003. During a couple of days their grandmother (the woman’s 
own mother) supervised the girls. She decided to have them circumcised and 
had it performed – a decision that ended up in a major conflict, since the girls’ 
mother was opposed to the practice. The Spanish-Gambian woman was 
acquitted by the Spanish court, since her only intentions had been to take her 
girls back to the country of origin, not to have them circumcised. The court 
held that it would be disproportionate to hold that leaving her children with 
her mother constituted negligence in the duty of care. This way of approaching 
the problem shows that courts struggle with the difficulty of not really 
knowing what happened and yet having to find some responsibility in those in 
charge of the children.30 
Two other Spanish cases are of particular interest for our discussion. In 
2011, a woman from Senegal was accused of having performed FGM on her 
daughter in the country of origin, before arriving to Catalonia. The National 
Audience appreciated error of prohibition because, living in a rural area of 
Senegal, she could not be expected to have known the laws in Spain. However, 
the court claims to have extraterritorial jurisdiction regardless of the fact that 
neither the mother nor the child resided in the state at the time of the facts, but 
the father did.31 In 2012, a Gambian couple living in Teruel was accused of 
having performed FGM on their baby girl: arriving in Spain when she was 
four months old, her genitalia looked normal in her first pediatric exam, but 
were altered six months later. Both parents were accused of having performed 
FGM on the girl in Spain, although they claimed it was performed in The 
Gambia, prior to their migration. The pediatrician’s words were considered 
incriminatory evidence and both parents were convicted: six years for the 
father and two years for the mother. The court stated that a long-term resident 
cannot claim to be unaware of the criminal provisions against FGM, but a 
person living in The Gambia can. Further, the court stated that, although it is 
impossible to admit culture as a mitigating factor, they must consider in this 
case a surmountable error of prohibition.32 
A similar reasoning followed the Verona case in Italy. The Venice 
Court of Appeal stated that the ignorantia legis excuse requires the union of 
two elements: a subjective element (the person’s situation and perception, 
knowledge, and so on) and the objective element (the context that could make 
that error insurmountable).33 The case involved a Type IV FGM in Verona 
one month after the enactment of the law prohibiting FGM. No informative 
campaign had been undertaken by public authorities to explain the new 
provisions, and the mother had recently arrived in Italy. The court held that it 
was not reasonable to expect the mother to have known that Type IV was 
prohibited under Italian law. 
ERROR IURIS AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE 
The previous cases and reasoning by the courts resonate with the cultural 
defense discussed in American and European courts and law journals since 
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the 1980s and, thus, the relations between error of prohibition, cultural 
expertise, and cultural defense need to be further explored. 
Frick (2014, p. 556) defines the cultural defense as an attempt to 
recognize values and norms in terms of legally privileged justifications toward 
exculpation (exclusion of guilt) or mitigation of the defendants’ guilt and 
punishment. As Van Broeck (2001) has pointed out, this concept needs to be 
coupled with the definition of culturally motivated crimes (a terminology 
currently accepted in Italy and Spain34), that is, “an act by a member of a 
minority culture, which is considered an offense by the legal system of the 
dominant culture. That same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of 
the offender, condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved and even 
endorsed and promoted in the given situation” (Van Broeck, 2001, p. 5). 
Needless to say, FGM fits perfectly with this definition. 
For our discussion, it is important to distinguish two different 
components of the cultural defense: the volitional and the cognitive, with quite 
different implications. The volitional cultural defense denies the defendant’s 
ability to resist the compulsion of his or her culture (his culture made him do 
it, he couldn’t help himself), while the cognitive defense argues that the 
individual simply did not know his or her actions were unlawful, 
encompassing cases of ignorance of law and mistake of fact (Gordon, 2001). 
While cultural defense as such does not exist as a formal principle within 
Europe (Frick, 2014), the examples show that different courts have dealt with 
cultural difference by referring precisely to the already existing defense 
theories of the error in prohibition. In fact, the cases discussed from Italy and 
Spain are cases in which a cognitive cultural defense (Frick, 2014; Gordon, 
2001) was deployed. The argument behind such a defense is that it would be 
unfair to judge people under laws they do not know or understand, or for acts 
that lack all the elements of the crime.35 These are cases for which the legal 
system accepts an exception of the maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” 
or people’s beliefs or knowledge cannot be placed above the law (Saws, 1986). 
Cultural cognitive defenses claim that the maxim is not absolute and can be 
outweighed in situations where cultural evidence is used to show that either 
the defendant did not realize there was a prohibition or her actions were 
different from what is prohibited (Gordon, 2001, p. 1813). In her analysis of 
different Spanish cases, Maqueda Abreu (2014, p. 207) points out that 
although courts are reticent to accept cultural defense as such, or culture 
amounting per se to error of prohibition, they do actually accept error of 
prohibition in their decisions as a mitigating factor. What is implied by 
cultural defense as such as opposed to error of prohibition, which makes 
courts reticent, is probably the widespread criticism the cultural defense has 
raised over the years, especially when the culturally motivated crime is one 
against women. 
According to Phillips (2003), the main critiques against cultural defense 
revolve around four issues: (1) It threatens to undermine legal universalism by 
elevating cultural membership above other considerations. The reasons why 
cultural difference would justify an acceptable form of ignorance of the law 
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need to be explained; (2) it will put in danger the rights of women, who tend 
to be the victims of such crimes. Cultural defenses, irrespective of whether the 
defendant is a man or a woman, reinforce patriarchal cultural practices that 
should not receive any institutional support. Cultural defense has been 
criticized for its potential to condone VAW; (3) it lends itself to stereotypical 
representations of non-Western people, as victims of their culture; and (4) it 
can lead to an opportunistic use of culture as defense. It is impossible to 
discuss these arguments but in some brief comments. We believe most of this 
criticism is better suited for the volitional strand than for the cognitive one. 
The first, third, and fourth arguments are straightforward reasons for the use 
of cultural expertise in different phases of the legal handling: when explaining 
the cultural factors that made a person unaware of the fact that she was 
committing a crime; helping the courts in avoiding the use and misuse of 
particularly static notions of culture as well as avoiding the use and abuse of 
stereotypes toward minority groups. Courts will then evaluate cultural 
expertise as the procedural rules of the state prescribe and probably as they do 
with any other expertise in court. 
The argument that says cultural defense threatens legal universalism is 
true if it is understood in the volitional strand (“their culture made them do 
it”), but it does not work so well for the cognitive strand (“they did not know 
it was unlawful”). As Gordon (2001) puts it, cultural difference as a form of 
ignorance means that “cultural forces prevented a defendant from realizing a 
fact, but he otherwise acted of his own free choice” (2001, p. 1815). Error of 
prohibition is a classic defense theory that is used in many situations and not 
just for dealing with cultural difference, so the question would rather be the 
opposite: how could cultural difference not be an acceptable form of ignorance 
of the law? It is true, however, that the problem arises in particularly troubling 
crimes (and not when “immigrants of East African countries are charged for 
chewing khat”; Frick, 2014, p. 566), as it is difficult to argue the “lack of 
knowledge regarding the existence of human rights such as the right to life or 
security of person” (Frick, 2014, p. 568). This argument, again, works well 
for certain “culturally motivated crimes,” such as “honor killings” (which 
Frick analyses), but it may not work so well for FGM, where the action itself 
is not indented as a crime or punishment by its actors (as opposed to killing) 
and no such obvious human rights are at stake.36 Thus, we share the concerns 
of using and abusing “culture” as a justification for different forms of VAW, 
by far the most discussed danger of the cultural defense.37 Yet, we believe that 
the presence of stereotyped images of minority cultures and minority women 
in court (see, e.g., Macklin, 2006) is what most hinders the modification of 
patterns of VAW among immigrant groups (rather than taking culture into 
account). Introducing cultural expertise in criminal court cases does not equal 
cultural defense; rather, it helps in contextualizing the criminal acts without 
reinforcing stereotypes. We need to further explore how cultural expertise and 
error of prohibition can work in favor of women’s rights. 
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In this chapter, we have tried to demonstrate that a distinction between 
atypical and typical FGM court cases is useful and that engaging cultural 
expertise is crucial in the legal handling of both categories. As regards atypical 
cases, they make unfair court cases which potentially cause evitable harm to 
families and individuals; harm that is avoidable if professionals are attentive 
to cultural issues at an early stage of the legal procedure. Also, the legal 
handling of typical cases calls for cultural expertise: courts need assistance 
when they are to decide what likely happened, or what can be established 
beyond reasonable doubt, in situations involving unfamiliar cultural 
dimensions. This is especially pertinent when the crime scene is located 
abroad. 
In both instances, the use of cultural expertise can minimize the 
stigmatizing effect that the criminalization of FGM may have both on specific 
immigrant groups and women of migrant background. Precisely because 
criminalizing a practice associated with a particular group without “playing 
into racist conceptions […] is a daunting and delicate task” (Macklin, 2006, 
p. 216), we need to further explore how the use of cultural expertise in the 
legal handling of suspected FGM cases can reduce the harms of unfair results. 
 
NOTES 
1. This chapter is part of a broader ongoing common work that has been published 
in Johnsdotter and Mestre i Mestre (2015) and Johnsdotter and Mestre i Mestre (2017). 
2. A note on terminology: We will use the acronym FGM (female genital 
mutilation) for the legal context. When we deal with the actors’ perspective, we will 
talk about circumcision of girls (Johnsdotter, 2017). Also, some researchers use FGC 
(female genital cutting). There is a growing occurrence of the terminological 
compromise FGM/C, which aims to reconcile conflicting views among a wide range 
of researchers using their own preferred term. 
3. Johnsdotter and Mestre i Mestre (2015). The countries included in the study 
were Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. It was of specific interest to include Switzerland in 
the analysis because legal proceedings regarding FGM had taken place in the territory, 
but this information is seldom included in EU reports. Both EIGE and the European 
Parliament have issued a significant number of documents. See, for instance EIGE 
(2015) on how to estimate the number of girls at risk, or European Commission 
(2016), a communication requiring states to end with FGM. 
4. An EU-wide survey launched by the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) on violence against women (2014) estimates that 3.7 million women in 
the EU have experienced sexual violence in the course of the 12 months before the 
survey interviews. This corresponds to 2% of women aged 18–74 years in the EU. 
5. We have discussed this in Johnsdotter and Mestre i Mestre (2017). 
6. Apologies for this oversimplification of such a complicated and long process. 
In 1997, several international organizations produced an Interagency Statement that 
was revised in 2008, due to the world indices of prevalence, earmarking 2010 as the 
proposed deadline for the eradication of the practice (Eliminating FGM. An 
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Interagency Statement; WHO, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, UNESCO, 
UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, 2008). 
7. ‘Type IV, unclassified: All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for 
non-medical purposes, for example, pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and 
cauterization (WHO, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNECA, UNESCO, UNFPA, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, 2008). Types I, II, and III are practised in 28 countries 
in Africa, and a few countries within Asia and the Middle East. The practice has also 
been reported in certain ethnic groups in Central and South America. Eighty-five 
percent of FGM belong to Types I and II. The remaining FGM, mainly Type III, is 
located geographically in the 
Horn of Africa, where the indices of prevalence are very high (e.g., Djibouti 93%; 
Somalia 98%). A further distinction is also made between practices that are carried 
out collectively that constitute socialized rites of passage (usually Types I, II, and in 
some cases Type IV) and those practised on individual women (Type III and in some 
cases Type IV). For a description of the complexity of the practices, see, for example, 
Walley (2005), Gunning (2005), Obiora (1997), James and Robertson (2005), 
Hernlund and Shell-Duncan (2007).  
8. From the perspective of prevention and abolishment, the meaning of the practice 
for the group and the way the procedure is carried out imply the use of differentiated 
strategies and instruments. 
9. For detailed information on all EU countries and Croatia regarding FGM 
(domestic legal frameworks, data, national policies, prevalence estimates, child 
protection routines, and so on), see EIGE (2013a) and EIGE (2013b). For analysis 
about European laws regarding FGM/C and their implementation see, Leye et al. 
(2007), Leye and Sabbe (2010), Kool (2010). 
10. See, for example, the recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe in 2002 regarding the protection of women against violence. 
For a systematic assessment of The Council of Europe discourse and actions regarding 
VAW, see Choudry (2016). 
11. Except for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. It has been ratified by Albania, 
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, and 
Turkey. 
12. For an interesting critique of the Convention, see Peroni (2016). 
13. The concept of “due diligence” has become a customary human right standard 
in international law since its emergence in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
See the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. 
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988). For an excellent account of the emergence and development of 
the standard, see Hasselbacher (2010). 
14. Declaration on the Elimination of all forms of Violence Against Women, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/48/104 (February 23, 1994). 
15. In 2006, UN officially endorsed the due diligence standard as a tool to fight 
violence against women, and recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights 
have developed the meaning and scope of the due diligence standard with regard to 
the state’s positive obligations to prevent, protect, prosecute, and redress violence 
against women, considering the failure to meet due diligence in the fight against 
violence as a form of gender-based discrimination. Case of Bevacqua and S. v. 
Bulgaria (Application n. 71127/ 01, ECHR 2008) and Opuz v. Turkey (Application n. 
33401/02, ECHR 2009). 
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16. Articles 5 and 12 of the Istanbul Convention establish the content of the 
obligations derived from the Due diligence standard and the general obligations States 
undertake with the signature. For an analysis on how the Convention impacts FGM, 
see The Council of Europe & Amnesty international (2014). 
17. Please note that the Istanbul Convention covers only Types I to III of the WHO 
classification. 
18. The principle of extraterritoriality was promoted by the European Parliament 
in 2001 and 2009, but was definitely embraced after the Istanbul Convention. The 
Convention has already had an impact in Spain and Germany regarding this principle. 
See Johnsdotter and Mestre i Mestre (2015). Art. 44 of the Convention is, by far, the 
article that has received more reservations. For instance, it imposes a duty on states to 
allow prosecution of certain crimes, including FGM, until well after the victim has 
reached majority of age, and some states, such as France, have made a reservation to 
this provision. 
19. The literature regarding Public Prosecution in Europe is wide and extended. In 
the last ten years, an important amount of comparative analysis has been developed 
and The Consultative Council of European Prosecutors works in collecting 
information about the functioning of prosecution services in Europe and 
implementing Recommendation (2000) 19 of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system. 
According to the CCPE, it has taken longer for harmonization in the field of law 
enforcement to emerge as a concern because the issue is a delicate one for the 
institutions in each state, with implications for the way that public authorities are 
organized. For a very interesting comparison of eight countries, see Martín Pastor et 
al. (2014). 
20. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-
life/ 11699603/FGM-Ogilvy-campaign-wins-Cannes-Lion-awards.html. Accessed on 
May 23, 2017. 
21. For a recent case of a doctor investigated for authorizing genital surgery of an 
adult woman, see http://www.standard.co.uk/news/health/doctor-cleared-over-fgm-
sayswomen-should-be-free-to-have-intimate-surgery-a3477941.html. Accessed on 
May 23, 2017. 
22. El País. Retrieved from http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2017/01/28/ 
catalunya/1485616989_ 147479.html. Accessed on May 23, 2017. 
23. From Johnsdotter’s research archive of criminal investigations concerning 
suspected FGM. 
24. J. Rogers further states that “The CPS” broad reference to the Code test has 
unsurprisingly failed to convince many that the prosecution was properly undertaken; 
at the very least, more explanation should be needed if the CPS wishes to regain public 
confidence over this episode. In the 2017 case (supra note 21), the press reports: “On 
the criminal investigation against him, he said it had ‘dragged on’ despite having no 
chance of success. “I gave an opinion in the same way that a barrister or a solicitor is 
asked to give an opinion. You can’t possibly be held up for aiding and abetting for 
giving an opinion. But it’s a highly political area. The pressure is on because they [the 
CPS] have never managed to get any convictions over the past 20 or 30 years.” 
25. Johnsdotter reports the first Swedish criminal court case based on the police 
investigation, transcripts of all police interrogations, audio-visual tape recordings of 
the three police interrogations with the young girl, and audio tape recordings of all 
court proceedings in district court and court of appeal. 
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26. Of course, this has been a major issue in private crimes and especially in VAW 
and rape cases. We broadly agree with the feminist critique that many forms of 
violence women face cannot be told in a coherent narrative and beyond all reasonable 
doubt, because the telling of a story of abuse inevitably reveals ambiguities. As Smart 
(1989, p. 34) put it, for rape trials, “the experience she wishes to convey is quite 
incomprehensible […] the language she will use to explain her experience will be seen 
as flawed […].” We nevertheless think that some coherence has to be drawn or has to 
be possible to make between what the victim says happened and what the context of 
the crime tells us: It has to be reasonable to believe that the facts narrated are plausible. 
See Ruiz (2009). 
27. The man’s sister travelled from Somalia to Sweden when she came to know 
that her brother was detained for suspected FGM. She presented herself in a police 
station in her brother’s city of residence in order to testify that his version was true. 
She was immediately detained and remained in custody for many months, until her 
niece had changed her story and said instead that it was her father’s new wife who had 
been present when the circumcision was performed. In the interrogation by the police, 
the girl stated that she had previously made these claims about her aunt’s presence 
because she “hated her” and 
“wanted to see her dead.” The reason for this bitterness was that her aunt, 
according to the girl, had told other Somali people that the girl “was a whore” 
(transcripts from police interrogations, March 27, 2006, and August 7, 2006). 
28. The importance of cultural expertise in the legal handling of suspected FGM 
cases is compellingly argued by Macklin (2006), who relates a case involving a 
Sudanese family in Canada: “neither the police, nor child welfare authorities, nor the 
lawyers involved approached the case with any real attentiveness to the complex 
cultural, social, and gender dimensions of the issue” (2006, p. 221). The charges were 
withdrawn when it was concluded that it was unlikely that an illegal circumcision had 
been performed. She emphasizes that professionals dealing with such cases – within 
the criminal justice system and child protection services – need to seek assistance 
when they are to deal with intercultural issues in order to avoid, as far as possible, 
evitable harm. See also Timmer (2015). 
29. There seems to be evidence that FGM has occurred in France, Switzerland, 
Italy, and possibly in Spain (Johnsdotter & Mestre i Mestre, 2015). 
30. In these cases, we possibly see the first signs of European systems dealing with 
caregivers who do not want to have their daughters circumcised but fail to sufficiently 
protect them from circumcision during stays in African countries. In criminal 
procedures, this implies a move from criminal intent to neglect of care when it comes 
to circumcision of girls living in Europe (Johnsdotter & Mestre i Mestre, 2015). 
31. National Audience AN 13/2011. 
32. Supreme Court Decision STS 835/2012. 
33. Corte d’Appelo di Venezia, 23 Nov. 2013, (dep. Feb 21, 2013), n. 1485. 
34. See Maqueda Abreu (2014), Basile (2013). 
35. Frick (2014) distinguishes three common arguments in favor of the cultural 
defense: the argument from necessity (a lesser evil than parallel judgments and 
societies); the argument from pluralism (imposing the norms of the majority would 
destroy cultural diversity that is valuable per se); and the argument from fairness, 
which again has three veins. The relativistic strand states that a system lacking cultural 
defense is unfair in imposing culturally biased rules to culturally different people; the 
deterministic strand affirms that it is unfair to pressure someone to act against his or 
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her culture and its ethical imperatives; and the epistemic/cognitive aspect suggests 
that ignorance of the law should be a defense for people raised in a foreign culture. 
36. It is a particularly Western idea to condone genital modifications in infant boys 
while banning any such modification in the genitalia of the girl. In practically, all 
societies where circumcision of girls is practiced, so is circumcision of boys, and the 
procedures are often seen as mirroring each other (PPAN, 2012). 
37. Although the discussion did not start with Okin’s essay, her publication Is 
multiculturalism bad for women? (1999) invigorated the discussion. See Ahamadu 
(2000), Dustin and Phillips (2008), Frick (2014), Green and Lim (1998), Igareda 
(2015), Volpp (2000), Mestre i Mestre (2011), Mohanty (2003), Phillips (2003), and 
Peroni (2016) among many others. 
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